# **Blessings and Curses of Covariate Shifts**

Adversarial Learning Dynamics, Directional Convergence, and Equilibria

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# **Motivation**

Two environments: source/training and target/testing

X covariate, Y response or label

Learn a statistical model/hypothesis  $\hat{f} : X \to Y$  using data collected from source/training dom

Deploy  $\widehat{f}$  to target/testing dom

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Small discrepancy between source/training and target/testing makes domain adaptation possible?

# Adversarial examples

#### Question

Small discrepancy between source/training and target/testing makes domain adaptation possible?



Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy, 2014

How to make the learned model  $\hat{f}$  robust to distributional shift, domain extrapolation or adversarial perturbation?

- robust features/representations (invariance)
- robust learning procedure (adversarial)
- regularization perspective
- loss function perspective
- other notions of robustness? boosting?

#### Chicken and egg problem:



- model environment change: RL, control, time series analysis
- study equilibria: game-theoretic, dynamics

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#### Lucas Critique, 1976

"Given that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary systematically with changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models."



This paper: game-theoretic and dynamic viewpoints

to study covariate shift and adversarial learning

# Literature and Background

#### Learnability $\pi_{\text{source}}$

Vapnik, 1999

$$\mathcal{R}(\widehat{f}, \pi_{\text{source}}) \leq \widehat{\mathcal{R}}(\widehat{f}, \pi_{\text{source}}) + \mathsf{VC} \text{ bound}$$
$$\mathcal{R}(\widehat{f}, \pi_{\text{source}}) \leq \inf_{f} \mathcal{R}(f, \pi_{\text{source}}) + \text{excess risk}$$

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**Dom Adaptation**  $\pi_{\rm source}$  vs.  $\pi_{\rm target}$  Ben-David, Blitzer, Crammer, and Pereira, 2006

$$\mathcal{R}(\widehat{f}, \pi_{\text{target}}) \leq \ldots?$$

## Learning vs. domain adaptation

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$$\mathcal{R}(\hat{f}, \pi_{\text{target}}) \leq \widehat{\mathcal{R}}(\hat{f}, \pi_{\text{source}}) + \text{VC bound} \\ + \boxed{\text{disc}(\pi_{\text{target}}, \pi_{\text{source}})} \\ \mathcal{R}(\hat{f}, \pi_{\text{target}}) \leq \inf_{f} \left\{ \mathcal{R}(f, \pi_{\text{target}}) + \mathcal{R}(f, \pi_{\text{source}}) \right\} + \text{VC bound} \\ + \boxed{\text{disc}(\pi_{\text{target}}, \pi_{\text{source}})}$$

## Learning vs. domain adaptation

Learnability 
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 $+ \frac{\text{disc}(\pi_{target}, \pi_{source})}{\mathbb{R}(\hat{f}, \pi_{target})} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{R}(f, \pi_{target}, \pi_{source})}$ 

Common hypothesis f with small error in both  $\pi_{\text{source}}$  and  $\pi_{\text{target}}$ Small discrepancy between measures  $\operatorname{disc}(\pi_{\text{target}}, \pi_{\text{source}})$  Common hypothesis f with small error in both  $\pi_{\text{source}}$  and  $\pi_{\text{target}}$ Small discrepancy between measures  $\text{disc}(\pi_{\text{target}}, \pi_{\text{source}})$ 

Hypothesis shift  $P_{\text{source}}(Y|X) \neq P_{\text{target}}(Y|X)$ concept (Bayes optimal) is a moving target, hard problem Ben-David, Lu, et al., 2010

Covariate shift  $P_{\text{source}}(X) \neq P_{\text{target}}(X)$ 

same concept, different evaluation metric, feasible problem

Stone, 1980; Shimodaira, 2000; Sugiyama, Krauledat, and Müller, 2007

What discrepancy  $disc(\pi_{target}, \pi_{source})$ ? How to encourage small discrepancy, or directly, small target error?

 IPM: disc(π<sub>t</sub>, π<sub>s</sub>) = sup<sub>f</sub> | ∫ ℓ(f, z) dπ<sub>t</sub>(z) - ∫ ℓ(f, z) dπ<sub>s</sub>(z) | total variation, adversarial metric Ben-David, Blitzer, Crammer, Kulesza, et al., 2010; Mansour, Mohri, and Rostamizadeh, 2009 What discrepancy  $disc(\pi_{target}, \pi_{source})$ ? How to encourage small discrepancy, or directly, small target error?

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- KL and likelihood ratio:  $\int \ell(f, z) d\pi_t(z) = \int \ell(f, z) \frac{d\pi_t(z)}{d\pi_s(z)} d\pi_s(z)$ reweighted ERM: weight data by likelihood ratio  $\frac{d\pi_t}{d\pi_s}$  Sugiyama, Krauledat, and Müller, 2007; Sugiyama and Mueller, 2005

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# Discrepancy and perturbation

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Closely connected! optimal transport/Wasserstein metric

$$\begin{aligned} |\mathcal{R}(f, \pi_{t}) - \mathcal{R}(f, \pi_{s})| &= |\int \ell(f, z) \, \mathrm{d}\pi_{t}(z) - \int \ell(f, z) \, \mathrm{d}\pi_{s}(z)| \\ &\leq \inf_{\gamma \in \Pi(\pi_{t}, \pi_{s})} \int \omega_{f}(||z - z'||) \, \mathrm{d}\gamma(z, z') \\ &\leq \mathrm{disc}^{\mathsf{W}}(\pi_{t}, \pi_{s}) \end{aligned}$$

#### Learn the best model within small discrepancy perturbation

- Adversarial learning and examples Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy, 2014; Ilyas et al., 2019; Madry et al., 2017
- Distributionally robust optimization Delage and Ye, 2010

 $\min_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \max_{\pi: d^{\mathsf{w}}(\pi, \pi_{\mathsf{s}}) \leq \gamma} \mathcal{R}(f, \pi)$ 

A long list: Bartlett, Bubeck, and Cherapanamjeri, 2021; Bubeck et al., 2021; Javanmard and Soltanolkotabi, 2022; Javanmard, Soltanolkotabi, and Hassani, 2020; Ross and Doshi-Velez, 2018...

$$\min_{f \in \mathcal{F} \pi: d^{\mathsf{W}}(\pi, \pi_{\mathsf{s}}) \leq \gamma} \mathcal{R}(f, \pi)$$

Two views:

- Game-theoretic view: finding equilibria
- Dynamic view: finding adversarial examples

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Two views:

- Game-theoretic view: finding equilibria
  - game between *learner* (statistical model, f) and nature (data distribution, π)
  - infinite dimensional game: does minimax theorem hold?
  - what notions of equilibria? Stackelberg, Nash
- Dynamic view: finding adversarial examples

$$\boxed{\min_{f \in \mathcal{F} \ \pi: \ \mathrm{d}^{\mathsf{w}}(\pi,\pi_{\mathrm{s}}) \leq \gamma}} \mathcal{R}(f,\pi)$$

Two views:

- Game-theoretic view: finding equilibria
- Dynamic view: finding adversarial examples
  - for a given model *f*, gradient ascent on data finds adversarial examples
  - equiv. Wasserstein gradient flow on  $\pi$

$$\pi := rgmin_{\pi} \ - \mathcal{R}(f,\pi) + rac{1}{\gamma} \mathrm{d}^{\mathsf{w}}(\pi,\pi_{\mathrm{s}})$$

• hardest extrapolation domain for a given model f?

# Game-theoretic and dynamic views: boosting

Boosting and KL discrepancy

Freund and Schapire, 1997, 1999

**Learner** linear  $f_{\theta}(x) = \langle \theta, x \rangle$ ,  $x \in \mathbb{R}^{p}$  prediction of weak learners **Nature** finitely supported on fixed points  $\pi_{w} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i} \delta_{(x_{i},y_{i})}$ ,  $w \in \Delta_{n}$  prob. simplex

Dynamics exponentiated gradient step

$$w^{t+1} := \operatorname*{arg\,min}_{w \in \Delta_n} - \mathcal{R}(\theta, w) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \mathrm{d}^{\mathsf{KL}}(w, w^t)$$

Equilibria max-min margin solution

$$\theta^{\star} = \underset{\theta: \|\theta\| \leq 1}{\arg \min} \max_{w \in \Delta_n} \mathcal{R}(\theta, w), \text{ where } \mathcal{R}(\theta, w) := -\sum_{i=1}^n w_i y_i \langle x_i, \theta \rangle$$

# Game-theoretic and dynamic views: boosting

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No extrapolation: <u>nature shift weights, same domain/support</u> Kullback-Leibler as discrepancy measure, exponentiated gradient Hypothesis shift: no.  $P_{source}(Y|X) \equiv P_{target}(Y|X)$ Covariate shift: yes.  $P_{source}(X) \neq P_{target}(X)$  Extrapolation: nature change domain, move outside support

Wasserstein as discrepancy measure, Wasserstein gradient

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#### Our goal: game-theoretic and dynamic

Adversarial covariate shifts move the current covariate domain to an extrapolation region. We precisely characterize the region driven by the adversarial dynamics, and subsequent implications to subsequent learning of equilibrium of the game.

# **Main Results**

• Model class: infinite-dimensional linear model

$$\mathcal{F} := \{ f_{ heta} \mid f_{ heta}(x) := \langle x, heta 
angle, heta \in \ell^2_{\mathbb{N}} \}$$

## **Problem setup**

• Model class: infinite-dimensional linear model

$$\mathcal{F} := \{f_{ heta} \mid f_{ heta}(x) := \langle x, heta 
angle, heta \in \ell_{\mathbb{N}}^2\}$$

• Risk or utility:

$$\mathcal{U}(\theta,\mu) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\pi_{\mu}} \left[ \ell(f_{\theta}(x),y) \right] = \int_{X} \left[ \int_{Y} \ell(f_{\theta}(x),y) \, \mathrm{d}\pi_{x}^{\star}(y) \right] \mathrm{d}\mu(x)$$

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• Conditional concept  $Y|X: \pi_x^{\star}(y)$ 

$$\begin{split} & \text{Regression: } \mathbf{y} | \mathbf{x} = x \sim \text{Gaussian} \left( \langle x, \theta^* \rangle, 1 \right), \ \ell(f, y) = \left( f - y \right)^2 \\ & \text{Classification: } \mathbf{y} | \mathbf{x} = x \sim \text{Bernoulli} \left( \sigma(\langle x, \theta^* \rangle) \right), \ \ell(f, y) = -fy + \log \left( 1 + e^f \right) \end{split}$$

# Equilibrum and dynamics

Game: model θ ∈ ℓ<sup>2</sup><sub>ℕ</sub> and covariate distribution μ ∈ P(X), competing for the risk

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- Game: model θ ∈ ℓ<sup>2</sup><sub>N</sub> and covariate distribution μ ∈ P(X), competing for the risk
- Equilibrium: Bayes optimal model f<sup>\*</sup><sub>Bayes</sub>(x) = ⟨x, θ<sup>\*</sup>⟩ is a Nash equilibrium of U(·, ·)

$$\begin{split} \min_{\theta} \max_{\mu} \ \mathcal{U}(\theta, \mu) &\geq \max_{\mu} \min_{\theta} \ \mathcal{U}(\theta, \mu) \geq \max_{\mu} \ \int_{X} \left[ \min_{\theta \in \ell_{\mathbb{N}}^{2}} \int_{Y} \ell(f_{\theta}(x), y) \, \mathrm{d}\pi_{x}^{\star}(y) \right] \, \mathrm{d}\mu(x) \\ &= \max_{\mu} \ \mathcal{U}(\theta^{\star}, \mu) \geq \min_{\theta} \max_{\mu} \ \mathcal{U}(\theta, \mu) \end{split}$$

### Equilibrum and dynamics

- Game: model θ ∈ ℓ<sub>N</sub><sup>2</sup> and covariate distribution μ ∈ P(X), competing for the risk
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 Dynamics: given model θ<sup>(0)</sup>, the covariate distribution μ<sup>(0)</sup> is adversarially perturbed incrementally with Wasserstein as disc. set stepsize γ ∈ ℝ<sub>+</sub>, initialize ν<sub>0</sub> := μ<sup>(0)</sup>,

$$\nu_{t+1} := \underset{\nu \in \mathcal{P}(X)}{\arg\min} \quad -\mathcal{U}(\theta^{(0)}, \nu) + \frac{1}{\gamma} W_2^2(\nu, \nu_t) \ , \ \text{for} \ t = 0, 1, \dots, T$$

and then set  $\mu^{(1)}:=\nu_{\mathcal{T}+1}$ 

We show two directional convergence results that exhibit distinctive phenomena:

#### Contributions

- 1. a **blessing in regression**, the adversarial covariate shifts in an exponential rate to an <u>optimal experimental design</u> for rapid subsequent learning
- 2. a **curse in classification**, the adversarial covariate shifts in a subquadratic rate to the <u>hardest experimental design</u> trapping subsequent learning

Let  $\theta^{(0)} \in \ell^2_{\mathbb{N}}$  be the current learning model and  $\theta^\star - \theta^{(0)}$  be the remaining signal to be identified

Define two unit-norm directions: the blessing direction  $\Delta_{\rm b}$  and the curse direction  $\Delta_{\rm c}$ 

$$egin{aligned} \Delta_{\mathrm{b}} &:= rac{ heta^{\star} - heta^{(0)}}{\| heta^{\star} - heta^{(0)}\|} \in \ell^2_{\mathbb{N}}(1) \ \Delta_{\mathrm{c}} &:= -rac{\| heta^{(0)}\|}{\| heta^{\star}\|} \cdot rac{ heta^{\star} - heta^{(0)}}{\| heta^{\star} - heta^{(0)}\|} + rac{\| heta^{\star} - heta^{(0)}\|}{\| heta^{\star}\|} \cdot rac{ heta^{(0)}}{\| heta^{(0)}\|} \in \ell^2_{\mathbb{N}}(1) \end{aligned}$$

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$$\begin{split} \Delta_{\mathrm{b}} &:= \frac{\theta^{\star} - \theta^{(0)}}{\|\theta^{\star} - \theta^{(0)}\|} \in \ell^{2}_{\mathbb{N}}(1) \\ \Delta_{\mathrm{c}} &:= -\frac{\|\theta^{(0)}\|}{\|\theta^{\star}\|} \cdot \frac{\theta^{\star} - \theta^{(0)}}{\|\theta^{\star} - \theta^{(0)}\|} + \frac{\|\theta^{\star} - \theta^{(0)}\|}{\|\theta^{\star}\|} \cdot \frac{\theta^{(0)}}{\|\theta^{(0)}\|} \in \ell^{2}_{\mathbb{N}}(1) \end{split}$$
  
blessing direction: 
$$\boxed{\Delta_{\mathrm{b}} / / \theta^{\star} - \theta^{(0)}}$$
  
curse direction: 
$$\boxed{\Delta_{\mathrm{c}} \perp \theta^{\star}}$$

Regression

Theorem (L., 2022)

Consider the regression setting where  $\ell(y', y) = (y' - y)^2$  and  $\mathbf{y}|\mathbf{x} = x \sim \text{Gaussian}(\langle x, \theta^* \rangle, 1).$ 

Let  $x_0 \in \text{supp}(\mu^{(0)})$  that satisfies a mild initialization condition, then the adversarial distribution shift dynamic satisfies

$$\lim_{T \to \infty} \left| \left\langle \frac{x_T}{\|x_T\|}, \Delta_{\rm b} \right\rangle \right| = 1 \ , \ \text{where} \ \Delta_{\rm b} / / \theta^\star - \theta^{(0)}$$

Moreover, the directional convergence is exponential in T,

$$\left|\left\langle \frac{x_T}{\|x_T\|}, \Delta_{\mathrm{b}} \right
angle 
ight| \in \left[1 - O\left(\frac{1}{e^{cT}}
ight) \ , \ 1\right] \ .$$

#### Some remarks

- adversarial distribution shift dynamics  $\mu^{(0)} \rightarrow \mu^{(1)}$  align all the mass of the covariates along **the most informative direction** for the next stage of learning: a one-dimensional "blessing" direction  $\Delta_{\rm b}$
- the adversarial distribution shift asymptotically constructs the **optimal covariate design** for the next stage of learning: making the current model  $\theta^{(0)}$  suffer is revealing the information towards the equilibrium of learning, the Bayes optimal model  $\theta^*$
- directional alignment is fast, exponential!

## **Regression:** numeric study



Regression setting, directional convergence. From left to right, top to bottom, we plot the directional information at timestamp  $t = 0, 5, 10, \ldots, 40$ , once every 5 iterations.

#### Theorem (L., 2022)

The learner's one-step reaction to the distribution shift with  $\eta=1/2$  satisfies

$$\lim_{n\to\infty}\lim_{T\to\infty} \|\theta^{\star}-\theta^{(1)}_{n,T,\eta}\|=0 \text{ a.s.}.$$

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For regression, the adversarial distribution shifts make the learner's one-step subsequent move optimal! The above shows that one-step improvement using gradient descent dynamic will reach the Bayes optimal model.

#### Classification

#### Theorem (L., 2022)

Consider the classification setting where  $\ell(y', y) = -y'y + \log(1 + e^{y'})$  and  $\mathbf{y}|\mathbf{x} = x \sim \operatorname{Bernoulli}(\sigma(\langle x, \theta^* \rangle)).$ 

Let  $x_0 \in \text{supp}(\mu^{(0)})$  that satisfies a mild initialization condition, then the adversarial distribution shift dynamic satisfies

$$\lim_{T \to \infty} \left| \left\langle \frac{x_T}{\|x_T\|}, \Delta_c \right\rangle \right| = 1 \;, \text{ where } \Delta_c \perp \theta^\star$$

Moreover, the directional convergence is quadratic in  $T/\log(T)$ ,

$$\left|\left\langle \frac{x_T}{\|x_T\|}, \Delta_c \right
angle \right| \in \left[1 - O\left(\frac{\log^2(T)}{T^2}\right), \ 1\right]$$

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$$\left|\left\langle \frac{x_{T}}{\|x_{T}\|}, \Delta_{c} \right\rangle\right| \in \left[1 - O\left(\frac{\log^{2}(T)}{T^{2}}\right), \ 1\right]$$

Proof non-trivial: a non-convex non-linear system for covariate shift dynamics.

#### Some remarks

- adversarial distribution shift dynamics  $\mu^{(0)} \rightarrow \mu^{(1)}$  asymptotically align all the mass of the covariates along a one-dimensional, "curse" direction  $\Delta_c \perp \theta^*$ , orthogonal to the Bayes optimal model.
- adversarial shift (under the logistic loss) asymptotically constructs the **hardest covariate design** under the 0-1 loss, for the next stage of learning. Namely, the  $(x, y) \sim \pi_{\mu^{(1)}}$  where y is a Bernoulli coin-flip that is independent of x, **impossible to predict**!
- directional alignment is slower, sub-quadratic!

#### Some remarks

- adversarial distribution shift dynamics μ<sup>(0)</sup> → μ<sup>(1)</sup> asymptotically align all the mass of the covariates along a one-dimensional, "curse" direction Δ<sub>c</sub> ⊥ θ<sup>\*</sup>, orthogonal to the Bayes optimal model.
- adversarial shift (under the logistic loss) asymptotically constructs the **hardest covariate design** under the 0-1 loss, for the next stage of learning. Namely, the  $(x, y) \sim \pi_{\mu^{(1)}}$  where y is a Bernoulli coin-flip that is independent of x, **impossible to predict**!
- directional alignment is slower, sub-quadratic!

Contrasts sharply with the phenomenon in the regression setting.

# **Classification:** numeric study



Classification setting, directional convergence. From left to right, top to bottom, we plot the directional information at timestamp  $t = 0, 25, 50, \ldots, 200$ , once every 25 iterations.

#### Theorem (L., 2022)

The learner's one-step reaction to the distribution shift with any fixed  $\eta > {\rm 0}$  satisfies

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \lim_{T \to \infty} \ \frac{\langle \theta^{\star} - \theta_{n,T,\eta}^{(1)}, \theta^{\star} \rangle}{\langle \theta^{\star} - \theta^{(0)}, \theta^{\star} \rangle} = 1 \ .$$

Moreover,

$$\liminf_{n\to\infty} \lim_{T\to\infty} \|\theta^{\star} - \theta_{n,T,\eta}^{(1)}\| > 0 .$$

#### Theorem (L., 2022)

The learner's one-step reaction to the distribution shift with any fixed  $\eta>0$  satisfies

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \lim_{T \to \infty} \ \frac{\langle \theta^{\star} - \theta_{n,T,\eta}^{(1)}, \theta^{\star} \rangle}{\langle \theta^{\star} - \theta^{(0)}, \theta^{\star} \rangle} = 1 \ .$$

Moreover,

$$\liminf_{n\to\infty} \lim_{T\to\infty} \|\theta^{\star} - \theta_{n,T,\eta}^{(1)}\| > 0 .$$

For classification, the above shows that subsequent learner's move using gradient descent dynamic (regardless of the number of steps) will be trapped with no improvement, preventing the learner from reaching the Bayes optimal model.

# Future Directions and Discussions

- Connections: adversarial learning and (automated) experiment design
  - regression: optimal design
  - classification: hardest design
- Tradeoffs: myopic learning vs. eventual learning
  - adversarial perturbation makes the current model suffer
  - yet, it may be beneficial to subsequent learning
- Lucas Critique:

"Given that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary systematically with changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models."

- Finite-sample bounds and nonlinear models
- Insights to understand GANs, domain adaptation, and more...

# Thank you.

Liang, Tengyuan (2022). "Blessings and Curses of Covariate Shifts: Adversarial Learning

Dynamics, Directional Convergence, and Equilibria". In: arXiv preprint arXiv:2212.02457.

## Intuition of the Proof

- Regression: PCA-based analysis
- Classification: novel proof technique
  - dynamic of the distribution shift is non-convex and non-linear
  - two summary statistics *a*<sub>t</sub>, *b*<sub>t</sub> to keep track of the directional convergence
  - rough intuition: after a finite time t<sub>0</sub>, a key quantity (L for Lyapunov)

$$L_t := \frac{\sigma'(a_t + b_t)a_t}{\sigma(a_t) - \sigma(a_t + b_t)} < 1$$

will cross below threshold 1 and deviate away from the threshold 1 for  $t \ge t_0$ . However, perhaps surprisingly, one can show even when  $t \to \infty$ , the quantity never cross below a threshold

$$L_t \geq \frac{1}{1+r}, \ \forall t \geq t_0$$

 still hard to operate with recursions, define two envelope functions to confine the flow

$$L_t^{\text{env}-\text{U}} := \frac{e^{a_t + b_t} a_t}{1 - e^{2(a_t + b_t)}}, \text{ and } L_t^{\text{env}-\text{L}} := \frac{e^{a_t + b_t} a_t}{1 + e^{a_t + b_t}}$$

## Intuition of the Proof

- $L_t^{\text{env}-\text{U}} < 1 \implies L_t < 1$ , and  $L_t^{\text{env}-\text{L}} > \frac{1}{1+r} \implies L_t > \frac{1}{1+r}$
- if the lower envelope function  $L_t^{\text{env}-L} > \frac{1+a_t^{-1}}{1+r+a_t^{-1}} \in [\frac{1}{1+r}, 1]$ , then the upper envelope function decreases in the recursion,  $L_{t+1}^{\text{env}-U} < L_t^{\text{env}-U} < 1$
- the lower envelope function cannot decrease too much

$$L_t^{\text{env}-\text{L}} > \frac{1 + a_t^{-1}}{1 + r + a_t^{-1}} \implies L_{t+1}^{\text{env}-\text{L}} > \frac{1 + a_{t+1}^{-1}}{1 + r + a_{t+1}^{-1}} > \frac{1}{1 + r}$$

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